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The Road Forward from Grable: Separation of
Powers and the Limits of "Arising Under"
Jurisdiction
Rachel M Janutis*
One of the most challenging procedural issues for the United
States Supreme Court has been defining the limits of federal
question jurisdiction over state law claims that necessarily raise
issues of federal law (the incorporation doctrine). In two recent
decisions, the Court has tied the limits of the incorporation
doctrine to the presence or absence of a parallel federal private
right of action. First, in Merrell Dow v. Thompson,1 the Supreme
Court seemingly concluded that the federal courts lacked federal
question jurisdiction under the incorporation doctrine if the federal
law at issue did not provide the plaintiffs with a private right of
action. More recently, in Grable v. Darue Engineering,2 the Court
held that the absence of a parallel federal right of action did not
conclusively preclude federal question jurisdiction through the
incorporation doctrine in all cases. However, the Court concluded
that the absence of a parallel federal right of action could preclude
incorporation jurisdiction in some situations.
This Article builds on the seminal works of commentators like
Professors Mishkin and Merrell in the area of the Erie doctrine. It
argues that the Court's current efforts to define the limits of the
federal courts' jurisdiction fail to account for the separation of
powers and embedded federalism issues in Article I's grant of
exclusive federal lawmaking power to Congress. When federal
courts exercise jurisdiction over state law claims that both replicate
federal rights and provide for their private enforcement where
federal law fails to do so, federal courts effectively imply a private
federal remedy where Congress chose to leave private enforcement
to the state courts. In so doing, courts interfere with Article I's
grant of federal lawmaking power to Congress. This Article
proposes to modify the unified balancing test enunciated in Grable
with a two-step inquiry. Under this two-step inquiry, courts would
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first examine the nature of the relationship between a state claim
and the would-be federal claim. For those cases in which the state
and federal claims touch on the same central concern, the absence
of a private right of action under federal law would preclude
federal jurisdiction over the state claim. For those cases in which
the state and federal laws do not touch on the same central concern
but merely intersect coincidentally, courts should perform the
balancing of state law and federal law interests envisioned by the
Court in Grable. In essence, the analysis should resemble a reverse
complete preemption analysis. The more closely the state law
claims mirror the would-be parallel federal claims, the more likely
that the absence of a private right of action should preclude
incorporation jurisdiction.
I. THE FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL COURTS

A. The Limits on the FederalQuestion Jurisdictionof the Federal
Courts
Article III provides that the federal judicial power shall extend
"to all Cases, in Law or Equity, arising under the Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made or which shall be
made." 3 The federal judicial power conferred by Article III is not
self-executing. Thus, federal courts lack the power recognized
under Article III unless specifically granted by an Act of
Congress. 4 However, since 1875, Congress has consistently
granted the federal district courts the power to hear cases "arising
5
under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States."
At least since 1900, the Supreme Court has interpreted this
Congressional grant of power more narrowly than the power
recognized under Article 111.6 To this end, the Court has recognized
3. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
4. John B. Oakley, FederalJurisdictionand the Problem of the Litigation
Unit: When Does What "Arise Under" FederalLaw?, 76 TEx. L. REv. 1829,

1833 (1998). Professor Oakley notes that some commentators have argued that
at least some degree of Article III's judicial power is self-executing but that the
weight of authority is to the contrary. To this end, Professor Oakley notes that in
Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), the Supreme
Court implicitly recognized that inferior federal courts could not exercise
jurisdiction under Article III absent a congressional statute granting jurisdiction.
Oakley, supra, at 1832-33.
5. Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 1331). See Oakley, supra note 4, at 1833 (recognizing the "enduring
grant of statutory federal-question jurisdiction enacted in 1875").
6. See Richard D. Freer, Of Rules and Standards: Reconciling Statutory
Limitations on "Arising Under" Jurisdiction,82 IND. L. J. 309 (2007). Professor
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three limits on the federal question jurisdiction of the federal
courts. First, the federal issue must arise on the face of the
plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint. 7 In other words, the federal
issue must bear on an element of the plaintiffs claim rather than an
anticipated or asserted defense. Second, the federal issue must be
substantial or central to the plaintiffs claim.8 Third, the federal
issue must
9 be asserted in good faith and cannot be patently
frivolous.
The substantiality or centrality limitation is the focus of this
Article and is the limitation that has proven the most troublesome
for the Court to define. For nearly 100 years, the Court has
recognized that a state law claim could give rise to federal question
jurisdiction if the resolution of the claim necessarily raised an issue
of federal law.' 0 In other words, an action to enforce state created
rights could give rise to federal question jurisdiction if an issue of
federal law was incorporated into the state claim. However, the
Court also implicitly recognized that not all state claims raising
embedded federal issues gave rise to federal question

Freer notes that the Court initially interpreted the grant of jurisdiction under
section 1331 to be coextensive with the limits of Article III, but that the Court
and Congress retreated from this interpretation. Id. at 314-16. In Snowshoe
Mining Co. v. Rutter, the Court expressly recognized that the statutory grant of
jurisdiction was not coextensive with the constitutional grant of jurisdiction in
Article III. 177 U.S. 505, 507 (1900).
7. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152
(1908) ("It is the settled interpretation of these words, as used in this statute,
conferring jurisdiction, that a suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the
United States only when the plaintiff's statement of his own cause of action
shows that it is based upon those laws or that Constitution. It is not enough to
show that the plaintiff alleges some anticipated defense to his cause of action,
and asserts that the defense is invalidated by some provision of the Constitution
of the United States.").
8. Commentators and the Court have used several terms to describe this
requirement. For example, some have asserted that the plaintiff's claim must
"directly" invoke federal law. See, e.g., William Cohen, The Broken Compass:
The Requirement that a Case Arise "Directly" Under FederalLaw, 115 U. PA.
L. REv. 890 (1967); Paul J.Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District
Court, 53 COLuM. L. REv. 157, 165 (1953). Others have asserted that the federal
issue must be "central" to the plaintiff's claim. See, e.g., Empire Healthchoice
Assurance v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 699 n.5 (2006); Freer, supra note 6, at 30
n. 4. Still others have characterized the requirement as a substantiality
requirement. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 814
(1986); Mishkin, supra, at 165; Oakley, supra note 4, at 1840.
9. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946).
10. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308,
312 (2005).
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jurisdiction." Defining which claims raised substantial or central
enough federal issues to give rise to federal question jurisdiction
(the incorporation doctrine) has provoked a vigorous scholarly
debate.1312 It also has proven to be a troublesome issue for the
Court.
B. Merrell Dow and the Introduction of the PrivateRight ofAction
After a relatively lengthy absence, the Court returned to the
incorporation doctrine in a series of recent decisions. First, in
Merrell Dow v. Thompson,"4 the Supreme Court refused to
recognize federal question jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' state law
products liability claims even though their negligence claims raised
an issue under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
("FDCA"). In one of the counts of their complaint, the plaintiffs
alleged that the defendant had violated the FDCA and that the
defendants' violation of 5the Act gave rise to a rebuttable
presumption of negligence.'
The Court re-affirmed the principle that a state law claim could
give rise to federal question jurisdiction where the vindication of
the state law right "necessarily turned on some construction of
federal law."' 6 However, the Court ultimately concluded that the
issues arising under the FDCA in the plaintiffs' claims were not
substantial enough to give rise to jurisdiction. 17 In reaching this
11. Id. at 313. ("As early as 1912, this Court had confined federal-question
jurisdiction over state-law claims to those that 'really and substantially involv[e]
a dispute or controversy respecting the validity, construction or effect of
[federal] law."') (quoting Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569 (1912)).
12. See, e.g., Patti Alleva, Prerogative Lost: The Trouble with Statutory
Federal Question Doctrine After Merrell Dow, 52 OHIO ST. L. J. 1477 (1991);
Pauline E. Calande, State Incorporation of Federal Law: A Response to the
Demise of the Implied Federal Rights of Action, 94 YALE L. J. 1144 (1985);
Cohen, supra note 8; Ronald J. Greene, Hybrid State Law in FederalCourts, 83
HARv. L. REv. 289 (1969); Freer, supra note 6; Linda R. Hirshman, Whose Law
Is It, Anyway? A Reconsiderationof FederalQuestion Jurisdiction Over Cases
of Mixed State and FederalLaw, 60 IND. L. J. 17 (1985); Alan D. Hornstein,
Federalism, Judicial Power and the "Arising Under" Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts:A HierarchicalAnalysis,56 IND. L. J. 563 (1980-81); Mishkin,
supra note 8; Note, Mr. Smith Goes to Federal Court: Federal Question
JurisdictionOver State Law Claims Post-MerrellDow, 115 HARv. L. REv. 2272
(2002) [hereinafter Mr. Smith]; Oakley, supra note 4.
13. See infra notes 14-42 and accompanying text.
14. 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
15. Id. at 805-06.
16. Id. at 809 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9 (1983)).
17. Id. at 814.
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that
conclusion, the Court first noted that the parties all conceded
18
the FDCA did not provide the plaintiffs a private right of action.
The Court relied heavily on the absence of a private right of action
under the FDCA. The Court explained that:
The significance of the necessary assumption that there is
no federal cause of action thus cannot be overstated. For
the ultimate import of such a conclusion... is that it would
flout congressional intent to provide a federal remedy for
the violation of the federal statute. We think it would
similarly flout, or at least undermine, congressional intent
to conclude that the federal courts might nevertheless
exercise federal question jurisdiction and provide remedies
for violations of the federal statute solely because the
violation of the federal statute is said to be a "rebuttable
presumption" or a "proximate cause" under state law,
rather than a federal action under federal law. 19
The Court continued:
Given the significance of the assumed congressional
determination to preclude federal private remedies, the
presence of the federal issue as an element of the state tort is
not the kind of adjudication for which jurisdiction would
serve the congressional purposes and the federal system ....
We simply conclude that the congressional determination
that there should be no federal remedy for the violation is
tantamount to a congressional conclusion that the presence
of the claimed violation of an element of the state cause of
"substantial" to confer federalaction is insufficiently
20
question jurisdiction.
Relying on this expansive language in the majority's opinion,
several lower courts and commentators concluded that Merrell
Dow barred federal courts from exercising federal question
jurisdiction over a state law claim if the incorporated federal law

18. Id. at 810.
19. Id. at 812.
20. Id. at 814.
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21
However, other courts
not Merrell
grant aDow
private
did
22 action.
to itsright
facts.of
limited

C. Grable: PrivateRight ofAction as a CongressionalVeto
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Grable & Sons Metal
Products v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing to resolve this
split among the lower courts regarding whether Merrell Dow
required a federal cause of action for exercising federal question
jurisdiction.23 The Court's answer was mixed. The Court
concluded that federal question jurisdiction did not require a
parallel federal cause of action. However, the Court also
recognized that the absence of a parallel federal cause of
24 action
would preclude federal question jurisdiction in some cases.
In Grable, the IRS seized property belonging to the plaintiff 5
Grable & Sons Metal Products, to satisfy a federal tax deficiency.2
The IRS then sold the property to a third party. Grable sued the tax
26
sale purchaser in state court, seeking to quiet title to the property.
Grable alleged that the tax sale purchaser did not acquire good title
to the property under state law because the IRS violated federal
law when it seized Grable's property. Specifically, Grable alleged
that the Internal Revenue Code required the IRS to provide notice
of a tax sale by personal service and that the IRS provided service
to Grable by certified mail rather than personal service. The tax
purchaser removed the case to federal court on the ground that the
claim raised a federal issue about the interpretation of the Internal
Revenue Code and, hence raised a federal question within the
meaning of section 1331. 2 The district court denied Grable's
21. See, e.g., Zubi v. AT&T Corp., 219 F.3d 220, 223 n.5 (3d Cir. 2000);
TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618, 622 n.2 (6th Cir. 2000); RCS
2000 LP v. Romulus Telecomms., Inc., 148 F.3d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 1998); Seinfeld
v. Austen, 39 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1994); Alleva, supra note 12, at 1538; Mr.
Smith, supra note 12, at 2289-90 (criticizing Merrell Dow's parallel right of
action requirement).
22. See, e.g., McNeil v. Franke, 171 F.3d 561, 563-64 (8th Cir. 1999);
Ormet Corp. v. Ohio Power, 98 F.3d 799, 806 (4th Cir. 1996). Indeed, one
commentator concluded that the circuits were evenly split. Mr. Smith, supra note
12, at 2281-82.
23. 545 U.S. 308, 311-12 (2005).
24. Id. at 318 ("Merrell Dow should be read in its entirety as treating the
absence of a federal private right of action as evidence relative to, but not
dispositive of [the existence of federal question jurisdiction].").
25. Idat310.
26. Id. at311.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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motion to remand, and the Supreme Court upheld federal question
jurisdiction over Grable's claim even though the relevant portions
Revenue Code did not afford Grable a private right
of the Internal
29
of action.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court laid out a multi-factor test
for evaluating whether the federal courts have federal question
jurisdiction over a state law claim that incorporates federal issues.
The Court concluded that a state law claim gives rise to federal
question jurisdiction if: (1) the state law claim necessarily raises a
federal issue; (2) the federal issue is actually disputed; and (3) the
federal issue is substantial. 30 Even if a state claim met these three
requirements, the Court concluded that a federal court could not
exercise jurisdiction unless the exercise of jurisdiction would not
"disturb[] any congressionally approved balance of federal and
state judicial responsibilities." 31 It is with respect to this last
factor-congressional intent to allocate jurisdiction between state
and federal courts-that the Court concluded that the presence or
absence of a parallel federal private right of action was relevant.
The Court explained that the absence of a federal private right of
action might, but did not necessarily, indicate that Congress
intended to foreclose federal Jurisdiction over state claims
implicating these federal statutes.
In applying its framework to the case before it, the Court
concluded that the issue of whether the Code required personal
service was essential to Grable's claim because it was the sole
basis upon which Grable claimed superior title.33 The Court also
noted that the proper interpretation of the Code was the only
disputed issue in the case. 34 Finally, the Court concluded that issue
was substantial for a number of reasons. First, the IRS had a
"strong interest" in the prompt and certain collection of taxes, and
the resolution of the federal issue in the case could interfere with
the IRS's ability to collect taxes through seizure and sale of real
property. Second, the Court noted that the IRS and tax sale
purchasers "may find it valuable" to have federal judges who are
more familiar with federal tax law resolve this issue. Finally, the
a small number of quiet title cases would
Court noted that only
35
raise federal issues.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.at311-12.
Id. at 314.
Id.
Id.at 318-19.
Id.at 314-15.
Id.at 315.
Id.
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In turning to the absence of a parallel right of action under the
Internal Revenue Code, the Court sought to distinguish Grable's
claim from the plaintiffs' claim in Merrell Dow. In so doing, the
Court explained that the combination of two factors rather than the
simple absence of a parallel private right of action led the Court to
find jurisdiction lacking over the plaintiffs' state law claims
incorporating the FDCA in Merrell Dow. The Court explained that
the combination of both the congressional failure to preempt state
remedies for product misbranding and the congressional failure to
provide a private federal remedy for misbranding demonstrated a
congressional desire to preclude federal question jurisdiction over
state claims incorporating the FDCA.36 The Court reasoned that by
failing to preempt state remedies for misbranding, Congress
envisioned that states would provide remedies for violations of the
federal misbranding requirements and that state remedies for
misbranding would lead to a large number of lawsuits. Exercising
incorporation jurisdiction over state claims for misbranding would
thus result in the removal of a large number of state claims to
federal court. 37 Because of the potential for a large number of state
misbranding claims, entertaining jurisdiction over such claims
would work a significant shift in the balance of jurisdiction
between state and federal courts. 38 Because Congress failed to
effect such a significant shift in judicial power by directly opening
the federal courthouse door through parallel federal suits for
misbranding, the Court reasoned that Congress could not have
intended to work such a shift in power indirectly by extending use
of the incorporation doctrine to include jurisdiction over state
claims for misbranding. 39 Thus, the Court reasoned that exercising
federal question jurisdiction over the case would have upset the
allocation of cases between state and federal courts.
In contrast, although Congress failed to provide a parallel right
of action for plaintiffs such as Grable under the Internal Revenue
Code, the Court did not see the same implications from that failure.
Unlike the federal misbranding regulations at issue in Merrell
Dow, the Court did not think it likely that states would provide
private remedies for violations of Internal Revenue Code notice
requirements. 40 As such, exercising jurisdiction over claims
incorporating the Code notice provisions would work a rather
insignificant shift on the balance of judicial power between state
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 318.
Id.at 319.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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and federal courts. 4 1 The Court was less willing to infer an intent to
foreclose such a small shift in judicial power from Congress's
failure to directly provide for federal jurisdiction through a parallel
federal right of action.42 In short, the Court viewed the potential
number of claims as dispositive. The Court reasoned, in essence,
that where the incorporation doctrine would create jurisdiction
over a large number of state claims, it was unreasonable to believe
that Congress would authorize jurisdiction without expressly
creating jurisdiction through a private remedy.
II. THE SCHOLARLY ACCOUNT OF INCORPORATION JURISDICTION
Commentators have argued that three different principles place
limits on the scope of the federal courts' incorporation jurisdiction.
Some commentators have viewed the incorporation doctrine as a
doctrine of federalism. Others have viewed the doctrine as a
struggle over the proper allocation of power between Congress and
the Court in determining the jurisdiction of the lower federal
courts. Finally, commentators have argued that prudential and
practical concerns about controlling the workload of the federal
courts animate the doctrine. None of these theories are exclusive,
nor are they inconsistent with each other. Instead, commentators
have relied on different aspects of each of the theories in offering
limits for the incorporation doctrine. Likewise, strains of each of
these theories underlie the Court's reasoning in Grable.
A. The FederalismAccount
Courts and commentators historically have viewed limits on
the incorporation doctrine as a matter of federalism. Under this
account, federal jurisdiction over state claims interferes with the
ability of states to develop their own regulatory policies through
their own court systems.43 Some of the strength of this objection to
federal court jurisdiction is undercut by the Erie doctrine. Under
Erie, the federal court will apply state substantive law to resolve a
state claim. However, even under Erie, concerns persist that
federal court application of state law will be less accurate than

41. Id.
42. Id. at 319-20.
43. See, e.g., Freer, supra note 6, at 312 ("At the same time, there must be
appropriate limits to ensure that federal question jurisdiction does not threaten to
inundate the federal courts or, importantly, to rob the state courts of their
legitimate authority to shape state law.").
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state court application of state law. 44 Additionally, while a federal
court will apply state substantive law under Erie, the federal court
will continue to apply its own procedural law. Differences in
federal and state procedural law will have an indirect effect on the
outcome of a case and, hence, have an indirect effect on the scope
of the rights and obligations at issue in the state claim. For
example, more liberal federal discovery or the ready availability of
summary judgment in federal court may affect the outcome in a
given case.
On the other hand, when a state law claim raises issues of
federal law, state court jurisdiction over these federal issues
interferes with the development of federal law in a similar manner.
Even though a state court will apply federal law to resolve the
federal issue, concerns persist that federal courts can better
interpret and apply federal law. Indeed, the desire for a better
interpretation of federal law is frequently cited as one of the
reasons for the grant of federal question jurisdiction.45 For
example, commentators note that claims arising under federal law
constitute a larger portion of the federal docket than the state
docket and, hence, a federal judge is more likely to spend a larger
portion of her time interpreting federal laws. Thus, federal courts
are perceived to have a greater expertise in federal law.4 6 This
expertise, in turn, is perceived to lead to a better interpretation of
federal law. Commentators also note that federal courts are better
able to perceive and consider the federal interest as support for the
notion that federal courts can provide a better interpretation of
44. For example, in a related context--defining the limits of the federal
courts' jurisdiction to hear state law claims that are pendent to federal claims,
the Court has recognized a desire for a better interpretation of state law as a
reason for declining to exercise federal jurisdiction over such state law claims.
See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (noting the desire
to obtain a "surer-footed" reading of state law as a reason for declining the
exercise ofjurisdiction over pendent state claims). The supplemental jurisdiction
statute retains this principle in that it authorizes a federal court to decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a supplemental claim if it raises a novel
question of state law or if the state law claims predominate over federal claims.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2000).
45. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 826-27
(1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The reasons Congress found it necessary to
add this [federal question] jurisdiction to the district courts are well known ....
In addition, § 1331 has provided for adjudication in a forum that specializes in
federal law and that is therefore more likely to apply that law correctly.").
46. MARTIN REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE
ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 2 (2d ed. 1990); STUDY OF THE DIvISION OF
JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 164-65 (Amer. Law Inst.
1969).
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federal law.4 7 Finally, state court interpretation of federal law is
less likely to result in uniform interpretation of federal law and,
hence, more likely to interfere with the federal interests underlying
the federal provisions.48
Thus, under the federalism account, the incorporation doctrine
is seen as an attempt to balance the states' interest in the
development of state law through accurate interpretation of state
law in state court against the federal interest in uniform and
accurate interpretation of federal law. This federalism concern is
clearly at work in Grable. For example, one of the reasons the
Court offers for extending jurisdiction to the claim in Grable is the
strength of the federal interest in a uniform and expert
interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code. 49 The Court weighs
this against the "microscopic effect" jurisdiction will have on "the
federal-state division of labor" and emphasizes the central role that
federal law issues, as opposed to state law issues, will play in
resolving the dispute. 5 The federalism account, likewise, is
evident in many of the Court's
5 1 other efforts to articulate the limits
of the incorporation doctrine.
B. The Article lI Account
Some commentators argue that efforts to formulate limits on
the incorporation jurisdiction of the federal courts raise issues
concerning congressional power to create the lower federal courts
47. See, e.g., Alleva, supra note 12, at 1495-96.
48. Id.See also Gil Seinfeld, The Puzzle of Complete Preemption, 155 U.
PENN. L. REv. 537, 542 (2007) (identifying securing uniform interpretation of
federal law as a core purpose behind conferring federal question jurisdiction on
the federal courts and advocating reformulated version of the complete
preemption doctrine centered around concerns about uniformity).
49. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308,
315 (2005) (citing the Government's "strong interest in the "prompt and certain
collection of taxes" as a reason why Grable's claim "sensibly belongs in federal
court" and noting that "buyers (as well as tax delinquents) may find it valuable
to come before judges used to federal tax matters"). See also id.at 319-20
(weighing the "clear interest the Government, its buyers, and its delinquents
have in the availability of a federal forum" against the absence of "threatening
structural consequences" and emphasizing that the interpretation of the Code is
the "dispositive and contested federal issue at the heart of the state-law title
claim" in finding jurisdiction).
50. Id.at 315.
51. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463
U.S. 1, 8 (1983) (explaining that a determination about whether to exercise
incorporation jurisdiction requires consideration of the "welter of issues
regarding the interrelation of federal and state authority and the proper
management of the federal judicial system" (emphasis added)).
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and to implicitly control the jurisdiction of those lower federal
courts under Article 11I. 52 Under this account, standards that allow
the Court greater discretion in formulating the limits of
incorporation jurisdiction interfere with congressional power to
define the jurisdiction of the lower courts. Thus, efforts to
formulate limits on incorporation jurisdiction must focus on the
language of section 1331 and the congressional intent behind the
grant of jurisdiction in section 1331. Under this view, federalism
and prudential concerns can animate limits on incorporation
jurisdiction only if such concerns are evidenced in congressional
intent.53
C. The PrudentialAccount
Finally, commentators also note that two prudential concerns
animate efforts to limit incorporation jurisdiction. First, limits on
the incorporation jurisdiction of the federal courts stem from a
desire to manage the workload of the federal courts. Exercising
incorporation jurisdiction over any case that raised a federal issue
or even any case that raised a federal issue on the face of a wellpleaded complaint would threaten to inundate the federal courts
with state claims.54 Indeed, the Court itself has expressly cited
concerns about managing the workload of the federal courts as a
consideration in determining whether to extend incorporation
jurisdiction. For example, in Franchise Tax Board, the Court
explained, "the phrase 'arising under' masks a welter of issues
52. See Alleva, supra note 12, at 1494 (observing that "Congress is the
intermediary between the Constitution and the lower courts, charged with the
fundamental decisions about the jurisdictional reach of these coordinate-branch
forums. Absent unconstitutionality, Congress controls lower federal court
jurisdiction.").
53. See, e.g., Martin Redish, Federal Common Law, PoliticalLegitimacy,
and the Interpretive Process:An "Institutionalist"Perspective, 83 NW. L. REV.
761, 785 (1989) (a court may not use statutory construction as a "mere guise for
substitution of its own policy choices, in derogation of those made by the
representative branches" and instead must interpret a statute "in the manner
most consistent with the policy choices made by the representative branches").
See John F. Preis, JurisdictionandDiscretion in Hybrid Law Cases, 75 U. CINN.
L. REv. 145, 147 n.1 (2006) (noting the debate among commentators regarding
the authority of the courts to define the scope of federal jurisdiction but arguing
that concerns about functionality should also animate the debate).
54. See, e.g., Freer, supra note 6, at 315 ("Permitting every case in which a
federal issue might be raised to invoke federal question jurisdiction would do far
more than create a workload problem necessitating some means of docket
control. The sheer volume of cases would imperil the lower courts' ability even
to function."). See also Seinfeld, supra note 48, at 545-46 (advancing docket
control as a justification for the well-pleaded complaint rule).
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and the
regarding the interrelation of federal and state authority
55
propermanagement of the federaljudicialsystem."
On several occasions, the Court has declined to extend
incorporation jurisdiction out of this concern that incorporation
jurisdiction would open the federal courts to an excessive number
of claims. For instance, in distinguishing Grable from Merrell
Dow, the Court relied on the fact that only a relatively small
number of quiet title suits would raise federal issues while a large
number of negligence suits would raise federal issues.56 Likewise,
in Snowshoe Mining Company v. Rutter, the Court declined to
extend jurisdiction to the constitutional limits because of the
potentially large number of cases that would fall within such
jurisdiction. The Court noted that if jurisdiction extended to every
case which raised a federal issue, "every action to establish title to
real estate (at least in the newer states) would invoke federal
question jurisdiction.' 57 Under this account, the limits on
incorporation jurisdiction seek to balance a desire for federal
resolution of federal issues against a desire to keep the workload of
the federal courts manageable and, hence, try to weed out the cases
implicating less significant federal interests.
Second, the desire to have certain and predictable jurisdiction
rules also animates limits on incorporation jurisdiction.5 ' As
jurisdictional rules become more case-sensitive and introduce more
judicial discretion, parties are less able to predict whether
jurisdiction is proper in federal court. This may increase the cost of
litigation by increasing the likelihood of litigation over
jurisdiction. Uncertainty may also dissuade litigants from availing
themselves of a potential federal forum, because litigants may
desire to avoid the expense and delay involved in jurisdictional
litigation. For these reasons, commentators note that the efforts to
define the limits of incorporation jurisdiction involve a struggle
between the desire, on one hand, to extend jurisdiction to all cases
implicating significant federal issues and, on the other hand, the
desire to provide a rule that is predictable and workable for
litigants. Indeed, this concern is central to Justice Thomas's
55. 463 U.S. at 8 (emphasis added).
56. See 545 U.S. 308, 319 (2006). See also supra notes 36-39 and
accompanying text.
57. Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 507 (1900).
58. See, e.g., Freer, supra note 6, at 342 ("Certainly jurisdictional rules
should be as clear as possible; no litigation seems as wasteful as that aimed at
whether the parties are in the right court.").
59. See, e.g., Mr. Smith, supra note 12, at 2292 (advocating a comity
approach to incorporation jurisdiction, in part, because the rule "fosters
jurisdictional clarity").
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concurring opinion in Grable.Justice Thomas ultimately concurred
in the majority's opinion in Grable, because the majority
"faithfully" applied Supreme Court precedent. However, Justice
Thomas acknowledged that he would be willing to reconsider the
propriety of incorporation jurisdiction in a case in which one of the
parties expressly challenged it. 6 1 Justice Thomas's primary
criticism of the incorporation doctrine was its lack of certain limits.
He wrote, "Jurisdictional rules should be clear. Whatever the
virtues of the Smith standard, it is anything but clear ....
62
Whatever the vices of the American Well Works rule, it is clear.",
III. THE ERIE DOCTRINE AND THE LIMITS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL
COMMON LAW POWERS

The Erie doctrine dictates that federal courts, when sitting in
diversity, have no power to promulgate their own federal common
law. Instead, federal courts are obligated to apply state substantive
law. The Erie doctrine has been universally recognized as a
product of federalism. However, the nature and origins of these
federalism limits have been the subject of scholarly debate.
Some early commentators and courts have embraced the "state
enclave" theory in explaining the federalist underpinnings of Erie.
These courts and commentators reason that either the Tenth
Amendment, general constitutional design, or both carve out a
field or enclave of local affairs that are committed solely to state
regulation. 63 In turn, the federal courts' act of promulgating
"general common law" prior to Erie intruded u on these areas
relegated exclusively to state legislative authority. Implicit in this
reasoning is the assumption that the federal power to displace state
choices about substantive social policy is coextensive among the
branches of the federal government.
However, building on John Hart Ely's seminal work, The
Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 65 some commentators have suggested
that the limits on federal judicial power recognized in Erie are
derived as much, if not more, from separation of powers

60. 545 U.S. 308, 320 (Thomas, J., concurring).
61. Id.at 321-22.
62. Id.at 321.
63. See generally John Hart Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 HARV.
L. REV. 693, 700-06 (1974) (describing the "state enclave theory" and citing
examples of its use the Supreme Court).
64. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474-75 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
65. Ely, supra note 63.
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principles. 66 They reason that the federalism at work in Erie is not
the overt federalism underlying the allocation of limited powers to
the federal government. Rather, they contend that the federalism at
work in Erie is the nuanced or embedded federalism that underlies
Article I's exclusive grant of lawmaking authority to Congress.
These commentators reason that the lawmaking power of the
federal courts is not coextensive with Congress. Rather, the
Constitution through separation of powers imposes an additional
limit of the lawmaking power of the federal judiciary.
Professors Mishkin and Merrill, for example, use the facts of
Erie to demonstrate that the lawmaking powers of Congress and
the judiciary are not coextensive. The underlying issue in Erie
concerned what duty, if any, a railroad owed to a person injured in
the railroad's right-of-way. Even as construed in 1938, the year in
which Erie was decided, Professors Mishkin and Merrill reason
that Congress would have had the power under the Interstate
Commerce Clause to regulate this issue. 67 Thus, had the federal
courts promulgated federal law on this issue, federal courts would
not have invaded an area left to the regulatory power of the states
exclusive of the federal government. However, they reason it was
universally accepted that federal courts lacked the power to
regulate in this area.68
Both Professors Mishkin and Merrill attribute the difference in
the limits of congressional and judicial lawmaking power to the
more democratic nature of Congress. Because states and their
interests are represented in an elected Congress but not in an
appointed federal judiciary, these commentators reason that
Congress has broader powers to displace state choices about social
policy through lawmaking than the federal judiciary. 69 Thus, while
Congress may have the authority to legislate nationally uniform
standards in certain areas of substantive regulation, the federal
judiciary cannot use their common law powers to regulate in those
same areas because of the lack of representation of state interest in
the formulation of those policies.
In this light, Erie can be viewed as an Article I limitation on
70
the power of the federal courts to use their common law powers.
66. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal
Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 14-15 (1985); Paul J. Mishkin, Some FurtherLast
Words on Erie-The Thread, 87 HARv. L. Rrv. 1682 (1974).
67. Merrill, supra note 66, at 14-15; Mishkin, supra note 66, at 1684 n.10.
68. Merrill, supra note 66, at 15-16; Mishkin, supra note 66, at 1684.
69. Merrill, supra note 66, at 17; Mishkin, supra note 66, at 1685-86.
70. See Mishkin, supra note 66, at 1683 ("Principles related to separation of
powers impose an additional limit on the authority of federal courts to engage in
lawmaking on their own (unauthorized by Congress). Or, to put the thought in
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When federal courts have promulgated general common law in
areas in which Congress had not chosen to regulate either
concurrently with or preemptively to the states, federal courts have
interfered with congressional lawmaking power under Article I.
Implicit in that power is the choice to regulate or not to regulate
and the choice to regulate concurrently with the states or to
preempt state regulation. Thus, when federal courts promulgate
law in an area which Congress has not regulated, such as the
liability of railroads for accidents in their rights-of-way, the affront
is to congressional preemptive powers-or more precisely,
Congress's choice not to exercise its preemptive powers. Viewed
in this light, the Erie doctrine, which prohibits courts from acting
when Congress has not acted, is a doctrine of separation of powers
and the indirect principles of federalism embedded in separation of
powers rather than a doctrine of direct federalism.
IV. MERRELL DoW AS AN ARTICLE I LIMITATION

This idea of embedded or indirect federalism can also shed
light on the scope of the federal courts' jurisdiction to hear cases
arising under federal law under section 1331. Courts and
commentators historically have viewed incorporation jurisdiction
solely as an interference with direct federalism principles and
Article III principles akin to the state enclave theory criticized by
commentators like Mishkin and Merrell. Namely, courts and
commentators have argued that the federal court's exercise of
jurisdiction over state law claims unduly interferes with the states'
ability to develop regulatory policies in an area reserved to the
states. 7' Additionally, courts and commentators have suggested
that it is an interference with congressional power under Article III
to create and define the limits of federal court jurisdiction.
These concerns over federalism miss the mark with respect to a
certain class of state claims.72 When federal courts exercise
jurisdiction over this class of state claims, federal courts do not
impermissibly interject the federal government into an area

terms used by Ely, aside from any limits on Congress' lawmaking, there are
state "enclaves" against intrusion by the federal judiciary.").
71. See, e.g., Freer, supra note 6, at 312 ("At the same time, there must be
appropriate limits to ensure that federal question jurisdiction does not threaten to
inundate the federal courts or to rob the state courts of their legitimate authority
to shape state law.").
72. See Hirshman, supra note 12, at 18-19 (recognizing cases in which
federal law prescribes a standard of behavior but fails to provide a private
remedy as one of the two classes of hybrid cases).
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reserved to the states' regulatory power. Instead, federal courts
impermissibly interfere with a Congressional choice not to regulate
in an area within its ambit and not to preempt state regulation in
the area. First, this Part will attempt to define this class of state
claims. Next, it will explain why such claims raise separation of
power and indirect federalism claims. Finally, this Part will describe
a standard for arising under jurisdiction that accommodates these
separation of power and indirect federalism concerns.
A. The Two Classes of IncorporationClaims
Part of the Court's difficulty in articulating clear limits on the
federal courts' incorporation jurisdiction stems from a failure to
distinguish between the types of state law claims that incorporate
federal law. In some cases, state law touches on the same core
concern as federal law and creates a right or obligation that mirrors
or incorporates a federal right or obligation. Expressed another
way, the state law describes the state right or obligation by
reference to federal law. In the language of the Court, the subject
of the state right or obligation is "of central concern to the federal
statute.,73 The state law then provides an alternative remedy,
usually a private remedy, for enforcement of that federal right or
obligation. In other words, the state law provides a container or
vehicle for the private enforcement of federal rights and
obligations.
The state law at issue in Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio
Railway74 provides an example of this type of incorporated claim.
A federal statute prescribed certain safety standards for railroads. It
also provided a private remedy for railroad employees injured by a
violation of one of these safety standards, but only if the injured
employee was engaged in interstate commerce. A Kentucky
employers' liability act touched on the same core concern.
Namely, the Kentucky Act regulated the circumstances under
which employers could be liable for workplace accidents. The
Kentucky Act incorporated the federal safety standard by making
violation of any federal safety standard a breach of Kentucky
law.75 Unlike the federal statute, Kentucky law allowed intrastate
employees as well as interstate employees to maintain a private
action to enforce the safety standard. Thus, it provided a private
remedy where federal law had failed to provide one. However, it
73. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 2526 (1983).
74. 291 U.S. 205 (1934).
75. Id.at 212-13.
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provided this remedy for what effectively amounted to a breach of
a federal obligation.
The state provision at issue in Merrell Dow can be viewed in
this light as well. The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
76
imposed standards for the labeling and distribution of drugs.
Ohio law provided that breach of one of those federally created
standards constituted negligence. 77 Both the federal Act and Ohio
law touched on the same central concern-the desire to regulate
the manner in which pharmaceutical manufacturers labeled and
marketed drugs to consumers. The Ohio law, by making breach of
the federal standard evidence of negligence, imposed an identical
obligation on manufacturers. However, unlike the federal statute,
the Ohio law provided for private enforcement of the federal
obligation. Federal jurisdiction over these state law "container
claims" poses potential separation of powers problems.
In contrast, in some cases the state claim and the incorporated
federal law do not share a central concern. Rather, the state law
creates rights and obligations that federal law concerns only
coincidentally or indirectly. Whereas in container claims Congress
has legislated in an area without preempting state regulation of the
same concern, in non-container claims no such decision is
apparent, or perhaps even applicable. Grable presents a good
example of this. The plaintiffs state law claim to quiet title
concerned property rights and title to real property. 78 In contrast,
the incorporated federal law, the Internal Revenue Code7
concerned the method for collection of federal tax deficiencies.
The federal tax code did not attempt to define the scope of property
rights or the indicia of ownership of real property. The two laws
intersected coincidentally or indirectly.
Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust presents another example.8 °
In Smith, a shareholder brought suit against Kansas City Title &
Trust to enjoin the company from investing in farm loan bonds on
the grounds that investing in the bonds would be a breach of
fiduciary duty.8 1 The shareholder alleged that investing in the
bonds would be a breach of fiduciary duty under Missouri law,
because the issuance of the bonds was not validly authorized by
law. The shareholder acknowledged that the bonds were issued by
76. 21 U.S.C. § 331 (2000).
77.
(1986).
78.
315-16
79.
80.
81.

See Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 805-06

See Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308,
(2005).
26 U.S.C. § 6335 (2000).
255 U.S. 180 (1921).
Id. at 195.
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the Federal Land Bank pursuant to the Federal Farm Loan Act and
that the Federal Farm Loan Act authorized the Federal Land Bank
to issue the bonds. 82 However, the shareholder claimed that the
federal Act was unconstitutional and, hence, that the bonds had not
been validly authorized.8 3 In Smith, the state law at issue governed
the obligations that the corporation owed to its shareholders. In
contrast, the Federal Farm Loan Act did not concern corporate
governance. Instead, it concerned emergency measures aimed at
stabilizing the market for farm mortgages and making farm
mortgages more readily accessible to increase capital available for
agricultural development. 84 It was relevant to the shareholders
claim, coincidentally, because the bank sought to invest in bonds
issued pursuant to the Act and the purported unconstitutionality of
the act gave rise to a breach of fiduciary duty. Federal question
jurisdiction over these coincidental claims raises more traditional
federalism and prudential concerns.
Indeed, courts and commentators have recognized this
distinction between indirect and direct conflicts in the area of
preemption doctrine. For example, the FDA most recently argued
that the Medical Device Amendments to the Federal Food Drug
and Cosmetic Act preempted state common law product liability
claims based on defects in the design or manufacture of medical
devices because those state common law duties touched on the
same central concern as the Medical Device Amendmentsnamely, the safety of the design and manufacture of the device. In
contrast, the FDA noted the Medical Device Amendment did not
preempt generally applicable state laws such as the UCC or general
electrical codes 85
that only incidentally pertained to the design of
devices.
medical
B. The Nature of the FederalInterests in State Law Container
Claims
Federal jurisdiction over state container claims does not raise
the types of federalism and Article III prudential concerns
underlying the traditional federalism account of incorporation
jurisdiction. Contrary to the traditional federalism account of the
incorporation doctrine, when federal courts exercise jurisdiction
82. Id. at 198.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 202.
85. Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent,
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 28 S.Ct. 999 (2008) (No. 06-179), 2007 WL 3231418
at *27-28.
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over state container claims, federal courts do not impermissibly
interject the federal government into an area reserved to the state's
regulatory power. Indeed, the fact that the state claim replicates
federal rights or obligations demonstrates that the area falls within
the purview of federal regulation. Not only could Congress act to
create rights and obligations in the area, Congress, in fact, has so
acted. As part of that power to regulate in the area, Congress could
have provided a private federal remedy under the statute.
Congress, likewise, could have delegated to the federal courts the
power to develop a federal common law to resolve disputes under
the statute. 86 Finally, Congress could have precluded state
remedies and regulations in the area. 87 Clearly, none of these
actions would be an undue encroachment of federal power on state
regulation. Similarly, federal interpretation of state law-even if it
is a less accurate interpretation of state law-could not result in an
undue federal encroachment on state regulation. Indeed, federal
courts supplanting state law with federal law would not be a direct
encroachment on state regulation.
In fact, as some commentators have recognized, the traditional
federalism and prudential accounts of arising under jurisdiction
would seem to supaport federal jurisdiction most strongly in state
As state claims come closer to merely
container claims.
replicating federal rights and obligations, the claims appear to
come closer to requiring interpretation of federal law
predominately, if not exclusively, and would appear to entangle the
federal courts in much less interpretation of state law than other
incorporated claims might involve. Where a state law merely
provides a private remedy for breach of a federal safety standard,
as is the case in a state container claim, the only legal issues to be
resolved in a dispute arising under state law would seem to center
around the interpretation and application of the federal safety
standard. Namely, the only issue likely to arise in the lawsuit
86. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957)
(recognizing that Congress delegated the power to federal courts to develop a
common law for resolving labor disputes under the Labor and Management
Relations Act).
87. See, e.g., Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act
§408(b), 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2000) (creating a "[f]ederal cause of action for
damages arising out of the hijacking and subsequent crashes of American
Airlines flights 11 and 77, and United Airlines flights 93 and 175, on September
11, 2001" and providing that "this cause of action shall be the exclusive remedy
for damages arising out of the hijacking and subsequent crashes of such
flights").
88. See BABCOCK, MASSARO & SPAULDING, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON
CIVIL PROCEDURE 247 (2d ed. 2006).
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would appear to be whether the defendant's conduct breached the
federal safety standard.
For example, consider a state law that makes it unlawful to
terminate an employee for engaging in conduct protected by a
federal, state, or local law and provides a private right of action to
any employee terminated in violation of this law. If a terminated
employee sues under the law alleging that she was fired for
engaging in conduct protected by federal law, the central issue
pertaining to liability would seem to be whether her conduct was
protected under the federal law, which requires a determination of
the law's meaning. A case such as this would most strongly fit the
purposes for arising under jurisdiction as explained by the
traditional federalism account. Federal issues will most certainly
arise in resolving the dispute. Extending federal jurisdiction would
seem to ensure a more expert and, hence, more accurate resolution
of these federal issues. Likewise, federal jurisdiction would ensure
greater uniformity in the resolution of the federal issues. In contrast,
because the issues surrounding liability are predominantly, if not
exclusively, federal issues extending federal jurisdiction would not
create the risk of an inaccurate resolution of state law issues. Thus,
the balance of federal and state concerns central to the traditional
federalism account would seem to warrant federal jurisdiction.
Further, adopting the assumption made by the Supreme Court in
Grable, state law claims alleging breach of a federal regulatory
standard are likely to arise frequently. As the Supreme Court notes
in Grable, extending federal jurisdiction over these claims will
shift a large volume of cases from state to federal court. However,
it is precisely because such a large volume of cases will be affected
that federal jurisdiction is most needed. Because these federal
issues will arise in a large number of
89 cases, federal jurisdiction is
most needed to promote uniformity.
This misplaced emphasis on the direct conflict between state
and federal lawmaking causes courts and commentators to fail to
account for the more nuanced federalism embedded in Article I
and misconceives the nature of the "federal" issues in these state
container cases. As Professors Mishkin, Merrill, and others
recognized in the context of the Erie doctrine, the lawmaking
powers of Congress and the federal judiciary are not coextensive.
Rather, Article I grants Congress broader lawmaking powers and
restricts the lawmaking powers of the federal courts. In acting to
regulate in the field in these cases where federal and state rights
overlap, Congress has defined the scope of these federally created
rights and obligations. Part of the Congressional power to regulate
89.

See id.
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includes the power to prescribe a manner for their enforcement
which excludes private enforcement. When federal courts entertain
jurisdiction over these state law container claims that seek private
enforcement of these federally-created rights, federal courts unduly
encroach on Congressional lawmaking power under Article I to
dictate the manner of enforcement and remedies available for
congressionally created rights and obligations.
Because the forum which resolves a dispute will apply its own
procedures to do so, the forum in which a dispute is resolved will
affect the ultimate outcome in the dispute. 9° In simple terms,
procedure affects substance. Thus, when courts choose to provide a
federal forum to vindicate disputes, necessarily that choice will
affect the scope of the obligations and rights at issue in those
disputes and, as such, interfere with Congressional choices about
the scope of the rights and obligations at issue. When state claims
merely replicate or incorporate federal rights for which Congress
has not provided a federal cause of action, as they do in state
container claims, the potential interference is compounded. As the
state claim comes closer to merely replicating the federal right, the
only essential difference between the state and federal claim
seemingly becomes the availability of a federal forum to enforce
the rights. Thus, when federal courts exercise incorporation
jurisdiction over these state claims, federal courts effectively
provide a private federal remedy. In so doing, courts expand the
scope of those federally created rights. Indeed, in the context of
direct implied remedies, courts and commentators have long
recognized that judicial implication of private remedies encroaches
on the Coniressional authority to regulate and amounts to judicial
lawmaking. When federal courts indirectly imply private federal
remedies through the federal enforcement of overlapping state
rights, courts likewise engage in the same impermissible judicial
lawmaking.
Moreover, by promoting a uniform federal interpretation of the
seemingly federal issues in these state container claims, federal
jurisdiction strips these claims of the essential state nature that
congressional choices about private enforcement and preemption
would have otherwise preserved. When Congress declines to
provide private enforcement of federally created rights but also
90. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L.
SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL

SYSTEM 830 (5th ed. 2003) (characterizing the role of federal courts in implying
private remedies for violations of federal statutes as "federal common
lawmaking").
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declines to preempt state regulation in the area, Congress leaves
open the possibility of private remedies in the regulatory field.
However, by failing to provide for private enforcement of the
federal right, Congress makes any private remedies exclusively
state remedies by nature. To demand uniform interpretation of the
federal issue in state container claims misperceives the state nature
of these claims. When states create state container claims, they
reference federal law merely as a shorthand for the rights and
obligations at issue. However, the rights and obligations at issue in
the state container claims remain quintessentially state created
rights and obligations. There is no need for a uniform federal
interpretation of the rights and obligations at issue in these state
container claims because they are not uniform claims. Rather, each
container claim is a creature of the state which created it and,
hence, open to differing interpretations from state to state.
Indeed, the potential for non-uniform interpretation of the
rights and obligations at issue could be an intentional part of
congressional design. A congressional choice to forgo federal
private remedies but leave an area open to state regulation may
reflect a desire to capture local sensitivities in the interpretation
and private enforcement of the rights and obligations at issue or a
desire to use the states as laboratories for the development of novel
solutions to complex legal problems. 92 As discussed above, federal
jurisdiction may interfere with those efforts to capture local
sensitivities. 93 For example, federal jurisdiction may remove a case
from politically accountable and more locally sensitive state courts
and the inteWretations that those politically accountable courts
may provide.
As Professors Mishkin and Merrell observed, one explanation
for the greater lawmaking power granted to Congress under Article
I is the states' representation in Congress. 95 Because states had
representation in the legislative bodies, states' interests would be
adequately protected through the legislative process.9 6 Thus, the
legislative branch should be granted broader power to encroach on
state interests. The Erie doctrine protects this embedded federalism
by ensuring federal courts do not supplant state law with federal
92. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
93. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
94. See REDISH, supra note 46.
95. See Merrill, supra note 66, at 17; Mishkin, supra note 66, at 1685.
96. See id.This was particularly true at the time the Constitution was
ratified because states appointed senators directly. This remains true even after
direct elections of senators because representation remains apportioned along
state lines.

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 69

common law in areas where Congress has chosen not to exercise
its lawmaking powers. In the same way, limits on arising under
jurisdiction should preserve this embedded federalism. Because
choices about whether and in what manner to provide for
enforcement of federally created rights and obligations invariably
affect the scope of those rights and obligations, these choices affect
the extent to which federal regulation overlaps with and, hence,
interferes with state regulation. Limits on the arising under
jurisdiction of the federal courts should ensure that federal courts
do not exercise their jurisdiction to supplant state law remedies
with federal law remedies in areas where Congress has expressly
left private enforcement to state law.
C. A New Theory ofIncorporationJurisdiction
What, then, would an arising under doctrine that focuses on
these Article I federalism concerns as well as traditional federalism
and prudential concerns look like? Such a doctrine would look
similar to the standard announced in Grable, with some
modifications. First, rather than creating a single balancing test for
all incorporation claims, an Article I standard would involve a twostep analysis. Additionally, the role of the private right of action
inquiry under such an Article I approach would differ from the
Court's approach in Grable.
In Grable,the Court promulgated a single balancing test for all
incorporation claims that sought to balance the federal interest in a
uniform interpretation of federal law against the state interest in a
more accurate interpretation of state law. 97 Under the Court's
approach in Grable, the private right of action inquiry served a
prudential purpose, with the absence of a private right of action
weighing against the exercise of jurisdiction in those cases where
federal jurisdiction would shift a large number of cases from state
to federal court. 98 Under an Article I approach, a court would
engage in a two-step process. First, the court would determine the
nature of the incorporation claim by examining the relationship
between the state claim and the would-be federal private right of
action. When the state claim touches on the same central concern
as the would-be federal claim and merely provides for private
enforcement of the federal right or obligation, as it does in a state
container claim, the absence of a parallel federal private right of
action would prove dispositive. When instead state law
coincidentally intersects with the federal law at issue, the absence
97. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.

98. See id.
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of a private right of action under federal law would not decide the
issue. In this way, an Article I approach to incorporation
jurisdiction alters only the relevance of the absence of a private
right of action and, consequently, the focus of the private right of
action analysis. The focus becomes not on whether incorporation
jurisdiction will shift a large number of state cases to the federal
courts-an inquiry premised on the traditional federalism account
of incorporation jurisdiction-but instead on the relationship
between the state right and the incorporated federal right.
On the other hand, in those cases where federal law arises
coincidentally in a state law claim such as Smith and Grable, the
absence of a federal private right of action would not interfere with
the congressional definition of federal rights and obligations and,
hence, would not preclude incorporation jurisdiction. In those
cases, a principle of inclusion that sought to balance the competing
interests in uniform and accurate interpretation of federal law and
state interest in accurate interpretation of state law would
appropriately define the limits of incorporation jurisdiction.
Indeed, this is exactly the approach that the Court took in Grable
when it sought to assess the substantiality of the federal issue by
weighing the federal interest in uniform interpretation of the
Internal Revenue Code against the likelihood that the federal issue
that any
would actually arise in the litigation and the likelihood
99
issues of state law would actually arise in the claim.
One common criticism of the Court's decision in Merrell Dow
is that it implicitly makes a parallel federal private right of action a
necessary condition for the exercise of incorporation
jurisdiction. 100 In so doing, critics contend the Court effectively
eliminates incorporation jurisdiction because in only a rare case
will a plaintiff forgo an available federal remedy. Critics contend
that this prevents federal courts from lending their expertise and
receptivity to claims that, although ostensibly cloaked in the
mantle of state law, raise important and substantial federal claims.
Viewing Merrell Dow as an Article I limitation on jurisdiction,
however, will not yield such a sweeping exclusion of incorporation
jurisdiction. The absence of a parallel right of action operates as an
exclusionary principle in only a certain class of incorporation
cases: state container claims. Thus, incorporation jurisdiction
would be excluded in cases such as Merrell Dow where the
practical effect of incorporation jurisdiction would be to create a
99. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods. Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S.
308, 315 (noting that the federal issue is actually contested and appears to be the
only contested issue).
100. See Alleva, supra note 12, at 1530-31; Freer, supra note 6, at 329.

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 69

private federal remedy. However, federal courts will be free to
balance the competing federal and state interests in those cases in
which federal and state law coincidentally intersect. Under such a
balancing test, federal courts will retain jurisdiction over state law
claims that raise important and substantial questions of federal law.
V. CONCLUSION

Current limits on the arising under jurisdiction of the federal
courts fail to account for the Article I federalism concerns
underlying a Congressional choice to forgo private enforcement of
federally created rights and obligations. Where Congress has
chosen to create federal rights and obligations but has not chosen
to provide a private federal remedy for enforcement of those rights,
federal courts should not provide an indirect federal remedy by
providing a federal forum for state law claims which merely
replicate federal rights but provide for private enforcement. In all
other cases, federal courts should remain open to exercise
jurisdiction over claims that raise substantial and central issues of
federal law even when those claims arise cloaked in the mantle of a
state claim.

